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Book Reviews
A THEORY OF ARGUMENT.  BY MARK VOROBEJ. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006. pp. x, 1-324. ISBN 0-521-67025-X, Pb. US $29.99 
A Theory of Argument is an advanced textbook “written for upper-level 
undergraduate students who have completed at least one prior course in 
argumentation theory, critical thinking, informal logic, formal logic, or some other 
related discipline” (ix).  This puts Vorobej’s book in a unique position since, to my 
knowledge, there are no other second course undergraduate textbooks with a non- 
symbolic focus. (Second course symbolic logic textbooks written for 
undergraduates, rather than primarily for graduate students, were relatively rare 
until recently; the past decade has seen a proliferation in such texts.) 
The book is divided into two parts. The first, comprising Chapters 1-3, is 
Macrostructure and the second, Chapters 4-6, Microstructure.  Each chapter is 
broken down into various subsections and each subsection, with two exceptions, 
has its own set of exercises. The exercises are a mix of theoretically oriented problems 
such as “Suppose that argument A is cogent for person P and not cogent for person 
P′. Is it possible that, prior to carefully reflecting upon A, P and P′ could share 
identical epistemic states? Justify your answer” (102), and application oriented 
problems such as “On the assumption that each of the following passages expresses 
at least one normal convergent argument, identify the macrostructure and construct 
a diagram of that argument” (189). 
Chapter One, titled “Arguments”, lays out the basic framework of the text and 
defines key terms such as argument, author, audience, argumentation, intentional
audience, social audience, propositions, inference, canonical form, static, noise,
embryonic argument, principle of charity, etc. With the exception of a heavy 
emphasis on theoretically oriented exercises, this chapter, the main purpose of 
which is to make the reader understand what arguments are and to understand the 
initial steps in extracting arguments from argumentative texts, could easily appear 
in an introductory text. Vorobej begins his text by writing “An argument is a social 
activity, the goal of which is interpersonal rational persuasion” (3) and initially talks 
of arguments occurring. However, Vorobej, without disavowing this commitment 
to arguments as a sort of act, quickly moves to talking of arguments as composed 
of propositions and inference claims. It is the propositions and the inference claims 
that ultimately determine the identity of an argument and it is the set of propositions, 
in relation to a given argumentative text, that have a canonical form, i.e., a 
macrostructure, and the propositions that bear evidential relations to each other, 
i.e., a microstructure. 
In Chapter Two, “Cogency”, Vorobej presents his choice for an evaluative 
framework. According to Vorobej, a “cogent argument, we’ll say, is an argument by 
which you ought to be persuaded. More precisely, an argument A is cogent for 
some person P, within some context C, just in case it is rational for P, within C, to be 
persuaded to believe the conclusion of A, on the basis of the evidence cited within 
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A’s premises” (47). Vorobej then discusses four conditions, each of which is 
necessary and which are jointly sufficient for cogency, viz., having the rational 
belief that the premise set (i) contains only true members, (ii) is relevant to the 
conclusion, (iii) grounds the conclusion and (iv) is compact.  Given that Vorobej is 
interested in the rational beliefs that the premises are all true and that the premise 
set grounds the conclusion, etc., Vorobej spends the next two sections articulating 
an understanding of rational belief based on Richard Foley’s theory of reflective 
stability—“if a belief in a proposition is rational for someone, then that person 
would eventually endorse that proposition after a process of due, or ideal, 
deliberation” (62). Vorobej then moves on to discuss ‘bad’ cogent arguments and 
‘good’ non-cogent arguments; he compares cogency with other properties such as 
validity, reliability, soundness, trustworthiness, actual truth of the premises, etc. 
Vorobej finishes Chapter 2 with a brief discussion of the relationship amongst one’s 
epistemic states, which he construes quite broadly, the argumentative context, and 
the conditions of rational belief, and concludes that “our own rational beliefs are 
not privileged over anyone else’s” (105). 
In the last chapter of Part One, “Normality”, Vorobej introduces the concept of 
a normal argument as a means of making cogency relevant to the use of the principle 
of charity for extracting arguments from argumentative texts.  According to Vorobej, 
“We’ll say that an argument A is normal, within a specific context C, just in case, 
within C, its author consistently believes A to be cogent both for herself and for all 
the members of her social audience” (111) and “we’ll assume that an argument is 
normal unless we have evidence to suggest it is not” (119). Given this normality 
assumption and the desire to represent arguments as conceived by their authors, 
Vorobej argues that it is appropriate to interpret argument strength in terms of 
argument cogency. He writes: “Our proposal to interpret argument strength as 
argument cogency is therefore restricted to contexts within which our primary aim 
is to represent an argument as it is conceived by its author, and where we have 
reason to believe—either directly or through an appeal to the normality assumption— 
that the argument in question is normal” (127). The upshot is that when extracting 
arguments from texts, we ought to prefer cogent arguments over non-cogent 
arguments (since the former are stronger than the latter). If we still have multiple 
cogent argument options to choose from, then more ‘objective’ criteria such as 
validity and reliability, etc., may come into play when trying to determine what the 
author’s argument is. Vorobej goes on to supplement the discussion of Chapter 
Two concerning what can be inferred about cogency on the basis of rational beliefs 
about validity and reliability. This chapter is the most theoretically oriented chapter 
of the book and most of the exercises are devoted to demonstrating theoretical 
understanding. 
Part Two of the text is devoted to argument diagramming, i.e., representing an 
argument’s microstructure—“the specific evidential relations that obtain between 
an argument’s propositional parts” (161). On Vorobej’s account of argument 
microstructure there are three significant types of arguments: convergent, linked,
and hybrid. The three chapters of Part Two deal with each of these types respectively 
and each chapter comprises a much more sophisticated and detailed discussion of 
microstructure than is found in introductory texts. 
Though based on the standard nodes (for propositional parts of the argument) 
and arrows (for the evidential relations) model of diagramming, Vorobej has added 
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more diagramming tools and gives each piece of the diagram a precise meaning so 
there can be no ambiguous diagrams. One significant and novel diagramming 
addition is the ability of the diagram artist to indicate disagreement with various 
claims of the argument author via squiggly diagrams (see section 4.5). So, for 
example, if we hold that it is not rational to believe a premise is true, then we can 
draw a squiggly node rather than a circular node for that premise, or if we hold that 
it is not rational to believe the premises ground the conclusion then we can draw a 
squiggly arrowhead rather than a normal arrowhead. 
The major theoretical divergence from standard accounts of argument 
diagramming is the introduction of what Vorobej calls hybrid arguments. On standard 
textbook accounts of argument microstructure there are five sorts of arguments, 
viz., convergent, linked, single, divergent, and serial (Walton 2006). Elsewhere I 
have argued that there is no issue with the notions of divergent and serial structures 
since such diagrams are merely diagramming cases where certain propositions are 
doing double duty (Goddu 2007a). Hence, serial and divergent ‘arguments’ are 
plausibly construed as multiple arguments represented via a single diagram and 
this is exactly how Vorobej construes them (see 180, 183).  Vorobej also takes single 
arguments to be a special case of convergence, which, I have pointed out elsewhere, 
is purely a definitional matter (Goddu 2007b). Hence the real difference between the 
standard accounts and Vorobej’s is that where the standard accounts have two 
classes, viz., convergent and linked, Vorobej has three, viz., convergent, linked, and 
hybrid (see also Vorobej 1995). One virtue of Vorobej’s idiosyncratic account is, I 
shall argue, that it provides the tools to explain at least some of the conflicting and 
muddled accounts of convergence and linkage (see Walton 1996) that have appeared 
in various first course textbooks. 
Given an argument A with a premise set S and conclusion C in which S is 
relevant to C, Vorobej defines three major classes of argument as follows:  convergent
arguments are such that “each premise within S is independently relevant to C” 
(172-173); linked arguments are such that “each premise within S is a member of 
some linked set, i.e., with respect to C” (225), where “a set of premises S forms a 
linked set with respect to some conclusion C, just in case each of the following 
three conditions obtains: (i) S contains at least two members; (ii) S is relevant to C; 
and (iii) no proper subset of S is relevant to C” (225); and hybrid arguments are 
such that S contains at least one supplementation relation (272), where a “set of 
premises S supplements a set of premises S′, with respect to a conclusion C, just in 
case (i) S is irrelevant to C; (ii) S′ is relevant to C; (iii) S and S′ together provide a 
stronger reason R in support of C, which S′ alone does not provide; and (iv) S and 
S′ are the smallest sets yielding R that satisfy clauses (i), (ii), and (iii)” (276-277). 
On Vorobej’s account the evidential relations that are being mapped by diagrams 
are favorable propositional relevance relations. On standard accounts of mapping 
relevance relations, some premises are independently favorably relevant to the 
conclusion on their own (convergence) whereas some work together with others to 
form favorably relevant reasons (linkage). But the true merit of Vorobej’s approach 
is a recognition that there are multiple ways that premises might work together to 
form favorable reasons for the conclusion. Speaking more broadly than Vorobej, 
though for a purpose that should become clear shortly, irrelevant premises might 
‘supplement’ each other to form a favorably relevant reason—this is Vorobej’s 
linkage; and on the other hand, irrelevant premises might supplement other 
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independently relevant premises or sets of premises to make even stronger reasons— 
this is Vorobej’s supplementation. Indeed, we might even say that independently 
relevant premises can supplement other independently relevant premises to form 
even stronger reasons—this corresponds to what Vorobej calls the ‘pooling’ of 
premises. But if we adapt Vorobej’s notion of supplementation to cover all the kinds 
of ‘working together’ Vorobej recognizes, then we can see how various authors 
come up with competing takes on what the convergent/linked distinction is. 
To make this clearer, consider four two-premise arguments with differing 
relevance/supplementation relations.  A. The premises are independently relevant 
and do not supplement each other.  B. The premises are independently relevant and 
do supplement each other.  C. One premise is independently relevant and one is not 
and the latter supplements the former.  D. Both premises are independently irrelevant 
but supplement each other to form a relevant reason. For those who take any 
supplementation as a sign of linkage, then A only will be convergent and B through 
D linked. For those who take supplementation by irrelevant premises as a sign of 
linkage, A and B will be convergent and C and D linked. For those who hold that 
each premise in a linked set needs to be irrelevant, A through C will be convergent 
and D alone linked. Hence, given Vorobej’s framework, we can see why so much 
debate has raged over the linked/convergent distinction, especially over cases 
falling into the B and C categories—a neat two-fold demarcation is trying to be 
imposed on something with more options. Vorobej’s more sophisticated account is 
able to capture and represent these options. 
Vorobej’s text is a careful and meticulous work clearly suitable as a second 
course book.  It is even plausible as a graduate level text. However, the text does 
have various shortcomings. For example, this text spends almost no time on the 
issue of distinguishing non-arguments from arguments; instead it focuses on 
extracting arguments from argumentative texts and extracting them with fidelity. 
Perhaps the assumption is that a first course has prepared the students to identify 
argumentative texts; but then again one might argue that identifying arguments is 
much more challenging than is often presented in basic texts and so is worthy of 
further study. 
In addition, the text is heavily skewed toward accurate and careful representation 
of arguments as their authors conceive of them with significantly less time devoted 
to argument evaluation or criticism. Much of what might be construed as concerning 
argument evaluation ultimately seems more related to determining various measures 
of argument strength in order to apply the principle of charity fairly when 
reconstructing and presenting an author’s argument. Direct discussion of the 
evaluation and criticism of arguments is minimal in the text. 
Those who are inclined toward objective evaluation criteria such as validity, 
reliability, true premises, etc., will be frustrated by the terminal focus on cogency 
and the attention paid toward whether it is rational to believe the premises are true 
or whether the argument’s author is being epistemically non-culpable or not. Even 
granting that paying attention to cogency questions is relevant, especially when 
trying to fairly represent an author’s argument, one might still want, for example, to 
know whether the premises actually ground the conclusion or not, and not merely 
whether it is rational for the author and his or her audience to believe so. For 
example, if we know that applications of the normalcy assumption and what we 
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know of the author’s epistemic state dictates attributing to an author an invalid 
argument in a context that requires validity, we can reject that argument on the 
grounds that it fails to meet the required standard regardless of whether the argument 
is in fact normal and cogent or not. 
Even if we restrict ourselves to Vorobej’s four cogency conditions, there seems 
a more elegant set of criteria available.  Given Vorobej’s interest in rational acceptance 
of the conclusion based on some body of evidence, one can easily argue that 
rational belief in (a) the truth of the premises and (b) the premises grounding the 
conclusion, is sufficient for rational acceptance of the conclusion. So what of 
compactness and relevance? Compactness, “each proper subset of its premise set 
S provides less evidential support for A’s conclusion than does S itself” (51), is 
meant to force each premise in S to be doing some necessary work.  But surely the 
inclusion of redundant, but relevant, premises does not suddenly make belief in the 
conclusion irrational. In addition, the inclusion of compactness conflicts with another 
of Vorobej’s measures of argument strength—i.e., vulnerability. Given an argument 
in which the premise set S is relevant to A’s conclusion, then A is vulnerable just in 
case “there is at least one premise P within S such that the elimination of P from S 
would destroy all relevant support for C”; hypervulnerable just in case “the 
elimination of any single premise P from S would destroy all relevant support for C”; 
and invulnerable just in case “there is no single premise P within S such that the 
elimination of P from S would destroy all relevant support for C” (247). But given a 
preference for invulnerable arguments, we should also prefer non-compact arguments 
since they are less likely to be vulnerable (and cannot be hypervulnerable).  Hence, 
why Vorobej insists on compactness as a cogency condition is not clear. 
The relevance condition is redundant. Since, as Vorobej points out, a set of 
premises that grounds the conclusion must be relevant to the conclusion, it must 
be the case that the truth, grounding, and compactness conditions by themselves 
are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for cogency. If one accepts the 
non-essential nature of compactness for rational acceptance of the conclusion, 
then truth and grounding become the two relevant criteria for argument cogency— 
but then we are quite close to a standard take on argument goodness. 
But if relevance of the premises is redundant given the nature of grounding, 
why include it as one of the four necessary cogency conditions? The reason, I 
suspect, is the second half of the textbook—the half which concerns diagramming 
various relevance relations. Here, however, we come to the most significant 
shortcoming of Vorobej’s text—why bother with microstructure at all? 
I have already acknowledged that Vorobej’s account of argument microstructure 
is much more sophisticated than any account available, but it too suffers from 
serious shortcomings. Firstly, and unsurprisingly, given the book’s emphasis on 
representing arguments in terms of how authors conceive of their own argument, 
Vorobej holds that “the purpose of diagramming an argument is to arrive at a graphic 
representation of the evidential relations that are claimed, by the argument’s author, 
to obtain among its propositional components” (164). So anyone who thinks we 
ought to be diagramming the actual evidential relations rather than the evidential 
relations as conceived by the author will once again be frustrated. 
Secondly, because Vorobej (i) relies on an intuitive notion of propositional 
relevance that is relative the each individual’s epistemic state and (ii) acknowledges 
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that “we have no grand theory to offer by way of identifying the macrostructure of 
enthymemes, or for determining whether an unexpressed proposition does or does 
not function within an argument as a premise” (171), he demonstrates how one and 
the same argumentative text can be reasonably construed, even from the author’s 
point of view, as any of the three argument types. He goes on to suggest that this 
is not a problem because “the different interpretations do not affect the strength of 
the argument’s grounding claim” (302).  Indeed, taking various disparate parts of 
Vorobej’s text we can see that an argument’s microstructure is largely independent 
of the nature of the argument’s grounding claim.  But if this is so, why is it important 
to determine an argument’s microstructure at all? 
The closest Vorobej comes to an answer is the following: 
Our interest in classifying arguments, according to their structural 
properties, transcends any mere taxonomical concern. The greater the 
number of structural options open to an author, the more flexibility she 
has, in principle, to respond to charges that her argument fails to be 
cogent. And audience members may all too hastily lay these charges 
precisely because of a lack of appreciation on their part of the different 
ways in which an author may conceive of the microstructure of her own 
argument. (308) 
But far from supporting the significance of determining argument structure or even 
argument structure as conceived by the author, this passage seems to suggest that 
authors are better off if they leave their arguments ambiguous as to argument 
structure so as to leave more defense options open. Of course, what is not at all 
clear is how different argument structures leave different defense options open, 
since, as Vorobej points out several times, cogency cannot be read off argument 
diagrams regardless of structure. So the question remains: why should we bother 
trying to map out the relevance relations at all?  Vorobej has not provided an answer 
to this. Hence, I am hard pressed to see why one should spend half a course (given 
Vorobej’s recommendation for the use of his text (ix)) teaching students how to map 
out these relations. 
A Theory of Argument stresses the importance of listening to arguers and 
representing arguments as conceived by their authors. Without doubt this is good 
advice and certainly something students of argumentation need to practice.  Vorobej’s 
text excels in this regard. But beyond the extraction and presentation of arguments 
as conceived by their authors, Vorobej’s text is much more tenuous. Those who are 
also interested in the objective representation and evaluation of arguments over 
and above the author’s own conception of his or her argument will need to look 
elsewhere. By focusing on the relevance relations, Vorobej sidesteps detailed 
discussion of one of the most important issues of argument theory: understanding 
how premises ground (or fail to ground) the conclusion.Vorobej’s account of 
microstructure fails in the same way that all accounts of microstructure fail—it 
provides no reason why determining an argument’s microstructure is at all important 
for those concerned with the presentation and evaluation of arguments. 
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G.C. GODDU University of Richmond 
This is a dictionary for students of logic. It covers a range of logical and logic- 
related topics which may be put in these four categories: (a) brief surveys of logical 
systems like propositional logic, quantificational logic, belief logic, deontic logic, 
mereology, modal logic, etc., (b) explanations of common logical terminology such 
as argument, contrapositive, entailment, fallacy, validity, etc., in addition to (c) very 
short sketches of the contributions of important logicians like Aristotle, Barcan 
Markus, Boole, Frege, Kripke, Quine, and Russell, and (d) some entries indicating 
the role of logic in fields outside logic proper, e.g., logic and God, logic and mind, 
logic and computers, and formal ethics. I think the entries are all reasonable, as far 
as they go. 
Compared with Kneale and Kneale’s The Development of Logic (1962), Gensler’s 
Historical Dictionary is much less ambitious.  The Kneales have much more detail 
and they often go deeper—but theirs is not a dictionary and since their interest is 
in logic in the narrow sense (see below), they give us only a history of logic in the 
narrow sense. Boole’s work, for example, gets over 10,000 words with the Kneales 
but only about 550 words in Gensler. Frege gets at least 20,000 words from the 
Kneales and about from 550 words, plus his own one-page bibliography, in Gensler. 
However, Gensler’s interests, as mentioned, range wider than do the Kneales’, and 
he has the advantage over them of being able to report on the additional growth of 
logic over the last forty-five years. Unlike the Kneales’ history, Gensler’s Dictionary
is extremely accessible and convenient for someone who just wants to know in 
outline what, say, deontic logic, or the continuum hypothesis, is. 
There is something eclectic about Gensler’s Dictionary that invites us to compare 
it with Quine’s Quiddities (1987).  In addition to what we expect (both books contain 
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